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ANDERSON v. CONBOY
156 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1998)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following his removal from his union
office as Business Representative, Linden
Anderson, a Jamaican citizen, filed a
complaint alleging alienage discrimination in
violation ofboththe Civil Rights Act of 1991
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New
York City Human Rights Law.' His
complaint also claimed "by terminating
[Anderson] as a business representative
without service of written specific charges, a
reasonable time to prepare a defense, and a
full and fair hearing" defendants violated the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (" LMRDA ").2 He sought injunctive and
declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive
damages.'
Linden Anderson emigrated to the
United States in 1968 and is a legal permanent
resident.' In 1973, he began working for
Local 17 of the United Brotherhood of
' Anderson v. Conboy, No. 94 Civ. 9159, 1997 WL
177890, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1997). The New
York City Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination
on the basis of alienage or citizenship. Chapter 1,
second, 8-107(1)(c) and 8-502 of the Administrative
Code of New York.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides: "All persons
within jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every state and territory to... to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings..." See also Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, §101, 105 Stat.
1071, 1071-72 (1991).
2 Anderson, 1997 WL 177890, at *2. See also
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5).
'Anderson, 1997 WL 177890, at *2.
4 Id. at*1.
Carpenters and Joiners ("UBC"). 5 Nineteen
years later, the UBC membership elected
Anderson to the office of Business
Representative.' For reasons not relevant to
this litigation, the UBC was placed under a
consent decree.7  The consent decree
designated Kenneth Conboy as Investigations
and Review Officer ("IRO").' As a court-
appointed IRO, his responsibilities included
broad oversight of the activities of the District
Council of New York and Vicinity ("District
Council") of the UBC.9
Conboy's investigation of Local Union
17 resulted in a deposition of Anderson held
on August 18, 1994."0 During Anderson's
deposition, Conboy discovered that Anderson
remained a Jamaican citizen." In a letter
dated August 29, 1994, Conboy notified
Anderson that he could no longer serve as a
UBC officer. 2  Conboy determined that




8 Anderson, 156 F.3d at 168.
" Anderson, 1997 WL 177890, at *1. The Consent
Decree conferred upon the IRO the authority "to
investigate the operations of the District Council and its
constituent locals [and] bring disciplinary charges
against officers and members of the District Council
and its constituent locals.. . ." Id. at *4 (quoting the
UBC Consent Decree 4(a)). Under the Consent
Decree, Conboy was authorized to: (1) "initiate
disciplinary charges" against any District Council or
union member for violations of any law, union
constitution or by-law, (2) review and curb
expenditures, (3) review contracts and proposed
contracts, (4) study and recommend changes to the
District Council's operations. Id. (omitting citations).
The court required Conboy to submit progress reports
back to the court for review. Id.
'0 Id. at *4.
" Id. at *1.
12 Id.
Anderson was ineligible for service because
he was not a United States citizen, in violation
of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America (the "United
Brotherhood") Constitution.13 Specifically,
Conboy cited section 3 1(A), which provides:
No member shall be eligible to
be an officer or business
representative, delegate or
committee member unless
such member is a citizen of the
United States or Canada, and
the member, to be eligible to
serve in any such capacity,
must be a citizen of the
country in which the Local
Union is located.14
Following removal from his position on
September 19, 1994, Anderson filed a
complaint against Conboy, the District
Council and its President, Frederick W.
Devine, the United Brotherhood, and Sigurd
Lucassen. 5 The District Council and Devine
filed cross-claims against Conboy16 for
13 Id.
" Id. (quoting section 31(A) of the constitution and
laws of the parent international union, the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America).
" At the time of the events, Lucassen was the general
president of the United Brotherhood. When Anderson
received Conboy's letter informing him that his
citizenship was contrary to the union's constitutional
requirements, Anderson requested a waiver of the
requirement from Lucassen through Devine. The
United Brotherhood constitution allowed the granting
of such waivers by the general president. Lucassen
initially declined Anderson's request, but later reversed
his decision. Anderson was reinstated to his position
December 14, 1994. However, Local 17 eliminated the
business representative position later that same month.
Anderson, 1997 WL 177890, at *1-2.
16 The District Council and Devine also filed cross-
claims against the United Brotherhood and Lucassen.
Id. at*1.
indemnification.' 7
All claims and cross-claims against
Conboy were dismissed.18 The district court
found that he had absolute immunity from any
liability arising from his activities as court-
appointed IRO.19  The court further
determined that Anderson had abandoned his
LMRDA claim. 2° Finally, the court dismissed
Anderson's claim under section 1981, finding
that its protections were limited to racial
discrimination.2 1 The court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Anderson's final claim, violation of the New
York City Human Rights Law. 2 On appeal,
Anderson challenged only the dismissal of his
section 1981 claim of alienage
discrimination. 3
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed the judgment of
the district court, concluding that 42 U.S.C. §
1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991 ("the 1991 amendment"), allows a claim
against discrimination by private actors on the
basis of alienage.2 4 Prior to the 1991
amendment, the statute proscribed alienage
discrimination by government actors.2' The
1991 amendment extended that prohibition to
private individuals.26  Consequently, the
statutory prohibitions present in section 1981
served as aproper basis for Linden Anderson's
alienage discrimination claim.
'7 Anderson, 1997 WL 177890, at *2.
1d. at *8.
191d.
20 Id. at *9.
21 Id. at *11.
22Id.
'Anderson, 156 F.3d at 169.
24 Id.
2s Id. at 178.
26 Id. at 180.
ANALYSIS
The United States Court ofAppeals for
the Second Circuit engaged in de novo review
of the district court's dismissal of Anderson's
complaint.27 It is well settled that the 1991
amendment bars racial discrimination by
governmental actors in the context of
contractual relationships. 8 Section 1981 bans
discrimination at all stages of contractual
relationships, including termination of an
employment contract.29 Further, the 1991
amendment extended the scope of section
1981 to private actors.3" In the instant case,
the disputed issue was whether the statute also
27Id. at 169.
281 Id. at 170.
29 Section 1981, as amended in 1991, is entitled "Equal
rights under the law" and provides:
(a) All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State
and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
(b) For purposes of this section, the
term "make and enforce contracts"-
includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual
relationship.
(c) The rights protected by this
section are protected against
impairment by nongovernmental
discrimination and impairment under
color of State law.
Prior to 1991, subsection (a) comprised the entire
statute.
3o Anderson, 156 F.3d at 170.
proscribed alienage discrimination by private
actors.
The post-1991 effect of section 1981
was a question of first impression for the
Second Circuit.3 Few prior cases had
examined the application of section 1981 to
alienage discrimination by either state or
private actors. No other circuit had decided
the issue, although two district courts
previously had held that section 1981 bans
alienage discrimination by private actors.32 A
third district court had taken the opposite
position, holding that section 1981 does not
prohibit alienage discrimination by private
parties.33
The sole question on appeal was
whether Anderson fell within the class of
persons protected by the statute. Initially, the
court examined the language of the statute,
finding that it was compatible with the
argument that section 1981 bans alienage
discrimination but was not dispositive of the
issue.34 The relevant portion of the statute
provides: "[A]ll persons ...shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts.., as is enjoyed
31 Id. at 169.
32 See Cheung v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(denying defendants' motion to dismiss a claim under
section 1981 alleging alienage discrimination by a
brokerage firm in refusing to open an investment
account for a Canadian citizen); Chacko v. Texas A &
M Univ., 960 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D. Tex. 1997), affd,
149 F.3d 1175 (5th Cir. 1998) (denying a summary
judgment motion on a section 1981 claim by a
Canadian citizen against a state university for
discriminatory termination ofan employment contract).
" See Murtaza v. New York City Health & Hosps.
Corp., No. 97-CV-4554, 1998 WL 229253 (E.D. N.Y.
Mar. 31, 1998) (relying upon a pre-1991 case, Rios v.
Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)), and
perceived conflict between the statute and the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
Anderson, 156 F.3d 177-78 & n.18.
m4Anderson, 156 F.3d at 171.
by white citizens."35  Although the
juxtaposition of "persons" with "citizens"
supports a reading prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of alienage, it simultaneously
permits an alternative interpretation. It may
merely guarantee that non-citizens enjoy the
same freedom from racial discrimination as
citizens. 6 Determining the scope of the text
to be unclear, the court looked further to the
legislative history of the Act, focusing
particularly on the statute's structure.37
The present statute consolidates
provisions of two separate enactments:
3 8
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
("1866 Act"), 39 and section 16 of the Voting
35 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1998) (emphasis added).
36 Anderson, 156 F.3d at 171.
37 Id. at 172-75.
31 See Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829
F.2d 1343, 1350 (5th Cir. 1987) (enbanc): "[Section]
1981 is a redactor's amalgam of two different
enactments, each aimed at a different group."
39 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27
(1866). Section 1 of the 1866 Act provided:
That all persons born in the United
States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed,
are hereby declared to be citizens of
the United States; and such citizens,
of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory in
the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit of all
laws andproceedings for the security
ofperson and property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains,
and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
Rights Act of 1870 ("1870 Act").4  Because
section 1 of the 1866 Act was passed pursuant
to the enabling section of the Thirteenth
Amendment, it proscribes race discrimination
by private as well as state actors.4
Nevertheless, section 1 of the 1866 Act
originally prohibited only acts of racial
discrimination against "citizens."
Ultimately, the basis for any
prohibition against alienage discrimination
found in section 1981 must have its origin in
section 16 of the 1870 Act.42 The 1870 Act
was passed pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibited discrimination
by state actors.43 Although the language of
section 16 resembles that found in section 1 of
the 1866 Act,' the court noted the particularly
relevant difference in language between the
two. While section 1 protected solely
"citizens," section 16 protected "all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States."
The use of "persons" mirrors the language of
the Fourteenth Amendment upon which the
1870 Act was based.45 This choice of language
indicates congressional intent to extend "the
country's guarantee of the equal protection of
the laws to 'any person within its
custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.
"The portions of Section 1 concerning the
rights to 'inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property,' were codified to create
what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1998)." Anderson, 156
F.3d at 172 n.8.
40 Voting Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat.
140, 144 (1870). Portions are identical to the present 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1998).
41 Anderson, 156 F.3d at 171. See Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968); Choudhuryv. Polytechnic Inst. of
N.Y., 735 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1984).
4
1Anderson, 156 F.3d at 173.
431d.
"Notably, the current 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) contains
language identical to section 16.
4 Anderson, 156 F.3d at 173.
jurisdiction.' ' 46
The court next examined the
legislative history of the 1870 Act. Senator
Stewart of Nevada sponsored the bill "which,
with minor revisions, would become sections
16 through 18 of the 1870 Act. 47 Senator
Stewart indicated that his immediate purpose
was the protection of the Chinese aliens in
California from burdensome and
discriminatory state laws.48 In the instant
case, Chief Judge Winter observed that "the
desire to protect Chinese immigrants from
discrimination, however, is as consistent with
prohibiting racial discrimination as with
prohibiting alienage discrimination.
49
Ultimately, the court found its most
persuasive evidence of congressional intent to
ban alienage discrimination in the structure of
the 1870 Act. Both sections 16 and 17 are
drawn from the bill sponsored by Senator
Stewart, S. 365.50 Section 17 of the 1870 Act,
"provided for criminal sanctions for any
person who, under color of law," deprived
"any inhabitant of any State or Territory... of
any right secured or protected by the last
preceding section of this act, or to different
punishment, pains, or penalties on account of
suchperson being an alien, orby reason of his
color or race, than is prescribed for the
punishment of citizens."5 Section 17, a
46 Id.
47Id. Senator Stewart saw the bill as "simply
extend[ing] to foreigners, not citizens, the protection of
our laws where the State laws deny them the equal civil
rights enumerated in the first section [of the 1866
Act]."
48 Id.
49 Id. at 174.
" Evidence of congressional intent to extend section
16's protections to aliens is provided by another
statement by Senator Stewart: "'we will protect
Chinese aliens or any other aliens whom we allow to
come here."'Anderson, 156 F.3d at 174 (quoting Cong.
Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.).
51 Id. (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §
16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 at 144 (1870)) (emphasis added).
criminal statute, has no direct application to
the instant case.52 Its specific relevance here is
enforcement of rights protected by section
16.11 The court reasoned that section 17's
enforcement of criminal penalties for those
discriminating against aliens would be
"anomalous" if section 16 did not include
aliens within its statutory protections. 4
The court further supported its
conclusion that section 1981 has always
prohibited alienage discrimination by
reviewing the case law on point. Only two
courts of appeal, the Fourth Circuit and the
Fifth Circuit, have directly addressed the
application of section 1981 to alienage
discrimination.55 Both courts agreed that the
pre-1991 statute prohibited governmental
Section 17 is codified, as amended, at 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1998). The complete text of section 17 provides: "And
be it further enacted, That any person who, under color
of any law, statute, or ordinance, regulation, or custom,
shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of
any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right
secured or protected by the last preceding section of
this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties
on account of such person being an alien, or by reason
of his color or race, than is prescribed for the
punishment of citizens, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the
discretion of the court." See Anderson, 156 F.3d at 175
& n.15 for further discussion of the amendments to
section 17.
52Anderson, 156 F.3d at 175.
53 Id.
54Id. "If, therefore, Section 16 did not prohibit
discrimination on the basis of alienage, Section 17,
imposing criminal penalties for depriving a person of
those specific rights 'on account of such person being
an alien,' wouldbe so anomalous as to make no sense."
" See Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829
F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (overruling Guerra
v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir.
1974)), vacated, 492 U.S. 901 (1989), reinstated on
remand, 887 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)
(decided prior to the 1991 amendment); Duane v.
Geico, 37 F.3d 1036 (4th Cir. 1994).
discrimination on the basis of alienage. 6
Nevertheless, they reached opposite
conclusions as to whether section 1981's
prohibitions extended to private actors prior to
the 1991 amendment.57 Both the Fourth
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit courts
recognized that the pre-1991 statute went
beyond race discrimination to prohibit
alienage discrimination. 8
The United States Supreme Court
expressly declined to decide whether section
1981 prohibits alienage discrimination by
private actors in Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Company. 9 However, twice it
has cited section 1981 while considering and,
ultimately, invalidating state laws that
discriminated against aliens. The Court neither
specifically construed nor relied upon section
1981 in Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commission60 or Graham v. Richardson.6
However, both opinions provide relevant
dicta.62 In Takahashi, the court declared
unconstitutional a California ban on the
issuance of commercial fishing licenses to
"any person ineligible to citizenship. 63 The
Anderson court concluded that "Takahashi
thus implicitly supports the proposition that
the pre-1991 section 1981 proscribed state
laws that discriminate oi the basis of
alienage."'  The Supreme Court partially
relied upon Takahashi in deciding Graham.
There the Court determined that state welfare
laws differentiating between citizens and non-
citizens in their criteria violated the Equal
Protection Clause." Referring to section 1981,
the Court noted that these laws overrode
"national [immigration] policies" against
alienage discrimination. 66
The court summarily dismissed the
two instances in which district courts have
concluded that section 1981 does not prohibit
alienage discrimination.6 7  In Rios v.
Marshall," the Anderson court held, the court
construed sections 1981 and 1982 as
"companion" cases, finding that claims under
6Anderson, 156 F.3d at 175-76.
"' Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded in Bhandari that
section 1981 only bans alienage discrimination by
government actors. The Fourth Circuit held in Duane
that the pre- 1991 statute prohibited such discrimination
by private actors as well.
" "The enactment of section 1981(c) in 1991 mooted
the arguments made in Bhandari and Duane over
whether Congress, in enacting the provisions which
later became present-day section 1981, meant to
prohibit private citizenship discrimination." Id. at 176
(quoting Cheung, 913 F. Supp. at 251).
" Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 96 n.9
(1973).
60 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948).
61 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
(invalidating state welfare laws that either denied
benefits to non-citizens or imposed residency standards
not required of citizens).
62 TheAnderson court provides the following language
from Takahashi: "'Congress, in the enactment of a
comprehensive legislative plan for the nation-wide
control and regulation of immigration and
naturalization, has broadly provided: [Text of Section
1981...] The protection of this section has been held to
extend to aliens as well as to citizens." Anderson, 156
F.3d at 177 (quoting Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419)
(footnotes and citation omitted).
6 Anderson, 156 F.3d at 177 (quoting Takahashi, 334
U.S. at 413).
C Id.
6 Id. The Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §
1.
66Anderson, 156 F.3d at 177 (quoting Graham, 403
U.S. at 378). Further, "'State laws that restrict the
eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because
of their alienage conflict with these overriding national
policies' set forth in... Section 1981." Id.
67 See Murtaza v. New York City Health & Hosps.
Corp., No. 97-CV-4554, 1998 WL 229253 (E.D. N.Y.
Mar. 31, 1998); Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351
(S.D. N.Y. 1981). Because both courts find that a claim
under section 1981 must allege racial discrimination,
neither addresses whether or not private actors fall
within the scope of the prohibition.
6530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
section 1981 must therefore allege racial
discrimination.69 In reviewing the Rios
analysis, Chief Judge Winter finds the
opinion's reliance on section 1982 analysis to
be inappropriate.70 Whereas section 1982 is
derived solely from section 1 of the 1866 Act,
section 1981 is partially derived from section
16 of the 1870 Act. Thus, he finds the
resulting decision ill-reasoned.7'
Additionally, both the Rios and
Murtaza v. New York City Health &
Hospitals2 decisions result from a contrary
reading of the Supreme Court's dicta in
Takahashi.73 Each court adopts a limited
reading of the Takahashi dicta that section
1981 extends to aliens, as well as citizens,
protection from racial discrimination.74 The
Anderson court concludes that this
interpretation is simply not persuasive.75
Having acknowledged and distinguished these
contrary cases, the court addresses the impact
of the 1991 amendment on construction of
section 1981.
After examining the case law, the
court directed its attention to the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, focusing on
whether section 1981 as amended proscribes
alienage discrimination by state actors.76 The
69 Anderson, 156 F.3d at 178.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 No. 97-CV-4554, 1998 WL 229253 (E.D. N.Y. Mar.
31, 1998).731 Id. See also Anderson, 156 F.3d at 178 & n.18.
71, "We also believe that the district court in Rios
understated the significance of Takahashi. See Rios,
530 F. Supp. at 461 n.9 (suggesting that Takahashi
merely established that aliens are protected from racial
discrimination by Section 1981, not that they are
protected from alienage discrimination). Similarly, we
are not persuaded by the reasoning in Murtaza, which
adopted in large part this reading of Takahashi."
Anderson, 156 F.3d at 178.
75 Id.
76 "The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Section 1981
by redesignating the existing text as Section 1981(a)
and by adding subsections (b) and (c)." Anderson, 156
newly-added subsection (c) of section 1981
provides that "[tihe rights protected by this
section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and
impairment under color of state law."77 In the
year prior to the amendment's passage, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in one
particular case. Dissenting from the denial of
certiorari, Justice White stated: "'Prior cases,'
citing Graham and Takahashi, 'have indicated
that § 1981 prohibits official discrimination
against aliens . . . . Certiorari should be
granted to settle whether § 1981 proscribes
private alienage discrimination.' 7 Congress
was therefore well aware that section 1981
had been interpreted to protect aliens from
discrimination and yet chose not to insert
"race" before "discrimination" in subsection
(c). Finally, because Congress was focused on
correcting the outcome in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union79 the legislative history
contains no reference to claims of alienage
discrimination."0 The court is persuaded that
this silence is not significant given Congress'
awareness of the implications of its
amendment, extending existing prohibitions to
private parties.8'
In its final paragraphs, the court
addresses appellees' argument that
determining alienage discrimination to be
within the prohibitions of section 1981 would
conflict with and potentially undermine the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
F.3d at 178.
77 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c).
78 Anderson, 156 F.3d at 177 (quoting Bhandari, 494
U.S. 1061, 1061-62 (1990) (White, J., dissenting))
(emphasis added).
79 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that section 1981 was
inapplicable to conduct occurring post-formation of an
employment contract).
8 Anderson, 156 F.3d at 179.
8, Id. at 179-80.
("IRCA").82 IRCA imposes sanctions on
employers who hire or continue to employ
aliens not in compliance with federal
immigration requirements. 83 Additionally, it
bans discrimination in employment on the
basis of national origin or citizenship. 84
However, the fact that IRCA and section 1981
partially overlap does not indicate conflict in
the judgment of this court." Chief Justice
Winter responds to appellees' suggestion that
employers might be held liable under section
1981 for refusal to hire illegal aliens: "If an
employer refuses to hire a person because that
person is in the country illegally, that
employer is discriminating on the basis not of




The Second Circuit has provided a
coherent, detailed basis for its conclusion that
section 1981 in its present form prohibits
alienage discrimination by private actors.
Because the district court had dismissed
Anderson's complaint, de novo review
mandated the court's rigorous examination of
both the case law and the legislative history of
both the original statute and the statute as
amended. Having decided that section 1981
proscribes alienage discrimination by private
actors, the court deemed Linden Anderson, a
Jamaican citizen and legal permanent resident
of the United States, to fall within the statute's
protections. Thus, his claim may now proceed.
In future litigation, courts should construe
section 1981 to reach private acts of
discrimination on the basis of alienage,
following the reasoning provided in the
" Id. at 180. See also Immigration Reform and




instant case. The Second Circuit has provided
a compelling argument for recognition of
alienage discrimination claims under section
1981.
As claims of racial discrimination have
occupied the courts in recent decades, claims
of alienage discrimination may well be the
next critical battleground in private
enforcement of civil rights. In the absence of
Supreme Court or legislative clarification on
this issue, a construction of section 1981
supporting a claim of alienage discrimination
is an essential tool for providing equality of
opportunity in employment. The Supreme
Court has determined that Title VII does not
prohibit discrimination on the basis of
citizenship.87 Furthermore, Title VII only
prohibits discrimination by employers with
fifteen or more employees.8 8 Only section
1981 offers a refuge for aliens discriminated
against in the employment context, including
those who experience discrimination by
smaller employers.
The number of immigrants living in
the United States has almost tripled since
1970, rising from 9.6 million to 26.3 million
today, accounting for 9.8 percent of the
population.89 That data is limited in its value
87 See Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 91.
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1998). Recently, the Fifth
Circuit held that employment-at-will relationships are
contracts for Section 1981 purposes, allowing an
African-American plaintiff to pursue her claim of
employment discrimination under the statute.
Lamarilyn Fadeyi, an at-will employee, could not have
pursued her racial discrimination in employment claim
under Title VII because her former employer had fewer
than 15 employees at all relevant times in the
employment relationship. Hence she based her claim
upon 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Fadeyi v. Planned
ParenthoodAss'n of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d 1048 (5th
Cir. 1998).
19 These figures were released by the Center for
Immigration Studies on January 8, 1999. The study
relied upon the Census Bureau's Current Population
Survey for March 1998 as its source for raw population
numbers. The Center is a non-profit organization
because it merges the populations of illegal
and legal aliens with foreign-born citizens.
However, it should provoke a sense of
congressional and judicial urgency to clarify
the application of our existing civil rights
protections to almost ten percent of the
American people. Public policy concerns
require no less. Ultimately though, until the
Supreme Court takes up this issue, victims of
alienage discrimination may continue to have
their claims disposed of at the summary
judgment stage by courts not in agreement
with the Second Circuit's analysis.
Summary and Analysis prepared by:
G. Carol Brani
supporting a policy of limited immigration. Gabriel
Escobar, The Washington Post (visited January 17,
1998) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nationalllongterm/immig/immig.htrn>. For more
data on immigration and related concerns, See
<http://migration.ucdavis.edu/Data/pop.on.www/fore
ignpop.html>.
